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Abstract 
Social media are now a routine part of political campaigns all over the world. However, studies of 
the impact of campaigning on social platform have thus far been limited to cross-section datasets 
from one election period which are vulnerable to unobserved variable bias. Hence empirical 
evidence on the effectiveness of political social media activity is thin. We address this deficit by 
analysing a novel panel dataset of political Twitter activity in the 2015 and 2017 elections in the 
United Kingdom. We find that Twitter based campaigning does seem to help win votes, a finding 
which is consistent across a variety of different model specifications including a first difference 
regression. The impact of Twitter use is small in absolute terms, though comparable with that of 
campaign spending. Our data also support the idea that effects are mediated through other 
communication channels, hence challenging the relevance of engaging in an interactive fashion.  
  
                                                           
1 Many people provided invaluable comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper. We would like to 
thank in particular Rebecca Eynon, Leticia Bode, and participants at the Reuters-OII Seminar of June 2017.  
2 
1 Introduction 
Over the last decade or so, campaigning on social media platforms (whereby political 
candidates create and maintain profiles on social media networks during electoral campaign periods) 
has become a core feature of contemporary political systems all around the world (Dimitrova and 
Matthes 2018). Initially a niche pursuit, now parties of all sizes and political leanings are making 
heavy use of these tools to promote their messages and candidates (for some examples see Bode & 
Epstein, 2015; Tan, Tng, & Yeo, 2016; Grusell & Nord, 2016; Quinlan, Gummer, Roßmann, & Wolf, 
2017; Samuel-Azran, Yarchi, & Wolsfeld, 2015; Koc-Michalska et al., 2016; Lilleker et al., 2011; 
Ramos-Serrano, Gomez & Pineda 2016). Indeed, this use of social media is now likely to be 
incorporated as one political communication tool among many others in professionally-run 
campaigns (Stromer-Galley, 2014, Štětka, Lilleker, Tenscher, & Jalali, 2014; Quinlan et al., 2017), 
which also includes a variety of other interactive web technologies (see Koc-Michalska et al., 2016, p. 
344-5; Kruikemeier, 2014, p. 135; Van Noort, Vliegenhart, & Kruikemeier 2016, p. 360). 
This article addresses the simple but foundational question of whether the effort put into 
social media platforms is effective in terms of winning votes. There is a small amount of literature 
that has already sought to treat this subject, which has produced diverging results. Some researchers 
have argued that there is a positive relationship between social media use and vote outcomes. For 
example, Kruikemeier (2014) found that politicians using Twitter in the Dutch national elections of 
2010 were more likely to be successful; Bode and Epstein (2015) look at aggregate measures of 
online influence (“Klout” scores) in the context of the US 2012 elections, also finding that politicians 
with more Klout were more successful; LaMarre and Suzuki-Lambrecht (2013) argued that 
‘candidates’ Twitter use significantly increased their odds of winning’ in the 2010 US House of 
Representatives elections; Vergeer, Hermans and Sams (2011) also claimed that ‘there is indeed a 
real effect of micro–blogging activity on the number of votes candidates receive’ in the context of 
the 2009 European Parliament elections; and most recently Bene (2018) found a correlation 
between shares on candidate Facebook pages and vote outcomes in the 2014 Hungarian elections.  
Others have argued that there is no relationship: for example, Vaccari and Nielsen (2013) 
produced a study showing that online popularity on Twitter does not correlate with vote share 
(though they did find a relationship in the case of Facebook), whilst Baxter and Marcella also 
concluded that there was little evidence of a causal relationship between social media use and vote 
share outcomes in the 2011 Scottish Parliamentary election (Baxter & Marcella, 2013, p. 203). Also 
notable in this regard is the fact that many systematic efforts to predict elections by studying social 
media activity have ended in failure (see, for example, McGregor, Morau & Molyneux, 2017, p. 10; 
Murthy, 2015; Gayo-Avello, 2013; Burnap, Gibson, Sloan, Southern & Williams, 2016; Jungherr, 
Schoen, Posegga & Jürgens, 2016).  
One potential reason for these diverging findings is that, to our knowledge, all of the studies 
on the issue so far are cross-sectional, in that they study one election in one country. Cross-sectional 
studies of the impact of social media (or indeed any campaigning technique) on vote share outcomes 
are potentially problematic because political campaigns will adopt multiple strategies in order to 
generate votes. Any measure of social media use may hence also act as a proxy measure for other 
types of engagement activities, or the overall professionalization of the campaign, or the campaign 
skill and charisma of the candidate (Levitt, 1994). Models of the relationship between social media 
use and vote outcomes will therefore be vulnerable to potential unobserved variable bias: social 
media use may simply be heavier amongst ‘better’ campaigns. Theoretically relevant control 
variables such as level of campaign spending can ameliorate the situation but not remove the 
problem entirely. For example, ephemeral characteristics such as the skill of the candidate or the 
dedication of campaign staff will be very hard to capture in this fashion.  
This study hence seeks to build on and extend this previous work, by offering a stronger test 
of the impact of social media use on vote share outcomes. We focus particularly on Twitter, which is 
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one of the most widely adopted social media platforms for political purposes (Jungherr, 2016), with 
high penetration rates in political systems all over the world: published research has documented its 
use in electoral competitions in countries as diverse as Pakistan (Ahmed & Skoric, 2014), Sweden 
(Larsson & Moe, 2012), New Zealand (O’Neill, 2012), Indonesia (Amirullah, Komp & Nurhadryani, 
2013), Spain (Aragón et al. 2013), Italy (Bentivegna, 2014), Australia (Bruns & Burgess 2011), Norway 
(Enli & Skogerbø, 2013) and South Korea (Hsu & Park, 2012), to take but a few examples. 
Our study leverages the fact that the United Kingdom [UK] has recently held two electoral 
competitions in relatively quick succession (in 2015 and 2017) to create a novel pseudo-panel 
dataset of the Twitter use of almost 6,000 politicians during two separate electoral periods. We 
observe the extent to which the level of Twitter activity in both periods correlates with vote 
outcomes (in both cross-sectional and pooled time-series regressions), and test whether this effect is 
robust to controls for potential confounding variables. We also estimate a series of first difference 
models on the limited subset of around 800 politicians who competed in both elections, a design 
which allows us to eliminate a wide range of unobserved variables such as the candidate’s 
campaigning skill or whether they are located in a safe seat. Our results demonstrate that 
campaigning on Twitter does indeed ‘make a difference’. We also show that larger parties are 
apparently more able to take advantage of the platform, and we undermine existing literature which 
has claimed that engaging with the platform in an ‘interactive’ style (by engaging in conversations 
and replying to citizens) is the most effective method of social media campaigning. We also provide 
suggestive evidence that the impact of Twitter is mediated through other channels (such as the 
mainstream media).    
 The remainder of the article is structured in the following way. Section 2 addresses theory 
about the political use of social media in general and outlines why campaigning on social media 
platforms might make a difference. It also specifies interaction effects that ought to moderate the 
extent to which social media campaigning is useful, and thus elaborates some hypotheses to be 
tested. Section 3 describes our methods, data collection and variable operationalisation. Finally, 
Section 4 presents our analysis and findings from the study.  
2 Political Campaigning on Twitter: Mechanisms and moderators of influence 
As a variety of authors have noted, social media platforms such as Twitter have altered the 
‘media ecology’ surrounding the public during political campaigns (e.g. Bimber, 2014; Gurevtich, 
Coleman, & Blumler, 2009), and these changes have opened up a variety of mechanisms through 
which a political candidate might influence voting outcomes. We split these into two basic types of 
pathway: direct and indirect mobilisation  
In terms of direct mobilisation, it is possible that the use of Twitter might open a channel of 
direct communication between the political candidate in question and citizens who are eligible to 
vote: individuals using the platform might see messages posted by candidates, either because they 
are directly connected to the candidate themselves (something which is increasingly common – see 
Pew Research Center, 2014), or because messages posted by the candidate are shared by their social 
circle. When voters see such messages, they are informed about both the existence of an upcoming 
election and that the candidate is someone they could vote for (some evidence for this is provided 
by Gottfried, Hardy, Holber, Winneg, & Jamieson, 2017, who have shown that knowledge of political 
campaigns correlates with social media use). Voters may be motivated by direct appeals to 
participate, something which Vaccari (2017) has shown to be impactful (though direct political 
appeals across social media can be treated with scepticism  - see Boerman & Kruikemeier, 2016). 
They may also be informed about characteristics of the candidate that might help sway their vote, 
for example they will receive ‘social information’ about the number of friends or followers a given 
candidate has (Margetts, John, Hale, & Yasseri, 2015). Research on Facebook has shown this to be 
politically powerful (Bond et al., 2012). There is also evidence that campaigning through social media 
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platforms such as Twitter leads to voters feeling more direct connections with politicians (Lee & 
Shin, 2012), something which is also likely to boost their willingness to vote.  
In addition to these direct connections, there is also the possibility of indirect mobilisation. 
As Murthy notes (2015), campaigning on platforms such as Twitter can be used to generate 
traditional press coverage, as the press themselves are covering social media, through a process 
sometimes described as inter-media agenda setting (see also Conway, Kenski, & Wang, 2015; 
Anstead & O’Loughlin, 2015). This press coverage may then stimulate further interest on the part of 
voters (Yasseri & Bright, 2016), whilst news articles may be shared via social media by either the 
candidate themselves or their supporters (Bright, 2016). Twitter messages may also be heard by the 
‘politically engaged public’ (Weaver et al., 2018), who may well be significant for mobilising further 
swathes of opinion. For example, they could act as ‘opinion leaders’: small groups of highly politically 
active people who then in turn go on to influence others within their own social circle (Dubois & 
Gaffney, 2014; Borge Bravo & Esteve del Valle, 2017; Bermudez, Bright, Pilet & Soubiran, 2016). 
Twitter use could also be a way of connecting to political activists, who might themselves contribute 
to further campaign efforts (see Bastos & Mercea, 2015). zThe possibility for both direct and indirect 
mobilisation effects through Twitter lead us to develop the first, basic hypothesis which is to be 
tested in the article: 
H1: Candidates who make more use of Twitter during an election period will win more votes 
In addition to these influence mechanisms, there are good reasons to expect that the 
possibility of realising electoral gains from Twitter use is likely to be moderated by other factors. One 
example here concerns the size of a candidate’s potential audience on Twitter (this is, clearly, of 
more relevance to the direct mobilisation mechanism than it is to the indirect one). This may relate 
to the extent to which Twitter is actually used amongst their potential voters. Many elections, such 
as the ones we investigate here, are fought in geographically constrained areas called 
constituencies, which may well have demographic profiles that vary considerably from the country 
at large. And demographics are known to be drivers of differential use of Twitter: in the UK, users of 
the platform are known to be considerably younger than average, considerably more likely to have 
higher levels of educational qualification and also more likely to be economically better off (findings 
from Blank, 2017, pp. 683-686; Malik, Lamba, Nakos & Pfeffer, 2015 also reach similar conclusions). 
Research has also suggested that they may be more likely to live in urban areas (Hecht & Stephens, 
2014; Barberá & Rivero, 2014). These different demographic profiles of Twitter users mean that we 
might expect the penetration of Twitter to vary considerably from constituency to constituency, and 
of course we would expect the impact of Twitter campaigning to be greater in areas with higher 
levels of Twitter use.  
The potential size of a politician’s audience also relates to the number of ‘followers’ they 
have on the platform (people who have chosen to receive output from the candidate). Followers are 
the people who are most likely to see the tweets produced by the campaign: hence having more of 
them indicates greater potential for the direct mobilisation mechanism described above (and 
research has found that increased follower levels for a candidate seem to make a difference – see 
Vergeer, Hermans & Sams, 2011). Of course, not every follower sees every tweet (Twitter’s own 
analytics suggested that tweeting two to three times a day would allow a typical account to reach 
30% of its followers every week – see Twitter, 2014). Nevertheless, more followers ought to indicate 
increased influence. Larger follower counts will also send a greater signal of political viability (which 
is consequential for both direct and indirect mobilisation). In this respect, it is interesting to note 
that many politicians operate what has been described as a ‘campaign  and withdraw’ strategy on 
social media (Enli & Skogerbø, 2013), whereby accounts are set up shortly before the election takes 
place and often deleted shortly afterwards. This is clearly less favourable to the development of 
large follower bases. These theories on audience size lead us to the second hypothesis to be tested:  
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H2: Politicians with larger audiences will benefit more from campaigning on Twitter 
In addition to audience size, a further line of research suggests that there may be party level 
differences in the effectiveness of Twitter use. One of the earliest debates within the digital politics 
literature concerned that between the theses of ‘equalisation’ and ‘normalisation’ (see e.g. Gibson & 
McAllister, 2015). The equalisation thesis suggests that minor parties are more likely to make use of 
digital technologies such as Twitter, because the low cost of communication on the platforms 
enables them to level the playing field when compared with more established actors who dominate 
traditional media channels (Enli & Skogerbø, 2013, p.759; Koc-Michalska, Lilleker, Smith & 
Weissmann, 2016; Larsson & Moe, 2014). The normalisation thesis, by contrast, suggests that large 
parties will make use of their existing resource advantages to also dominate these new channels.  
While these debates largely relate to who is using the technology, Gibson and McAllister 
(2015) also specifically relate them to who benefits from the technology, providing evidence that 
green parties appeared to benefit more from using social media than their more mainstream 
competitors in Australian elections, a finding they relate to the fact that these voters are typically 
drawn from younger demographics (see Gibson & McAllister, 2015, p.542). Recent studies showing 
that social media have a positive impact on the youth vote seem to support this idea (Vaccari, 2017; 
Garzia, Trechsel, & De Angelis 2017; Aldrich, Gibson, Cantijoch & Konitzer, 2015).2 Hence, we 
develop our next hypothesis: 
H3: Politicians from smaller parties will benefit more from campaigning on Twitter 
 Another potentially relevant factor concerns the political makeup of those interacting with 
the politician. A recurring line of research in studies of digital politics concerns what could be 
referred to as the ‘echo chamber’ thesis (see e.g. Conover et al., 2012; Bright, 2018): the idea that on 
social media, conversations are largely held amongst those who already agree with each other. In 
the case of Twitter in the UK in particular, Weaver et al. (2018) have argued that there is a ‘dominant 
state of partisan segregation’ on the platform. It could be that politicians who have more 
heterogeneous political networks are better able to reach and influence people who were not 
already considering voting for them (though of course mobilising those who already agree with you 
may have important benefits in itself by increasing the likelihood they will turn out to vote and by 
perhaps convincing them to engage actively in a campaign). This leads us to our fourth hypothesis: 
H4: Politicians with more heterogeneous political networks will benefit more from campaigning on 
Twitter 
 A final aspect to consider is the style of engagement that politicians make with Twitter, a 
subject that has generated a considerable literature (see e.g. Graham, Jackson & Broersma, 2014; 
Evans, Cordova & Sipole, 2014; Golbeck, Grimes & Rogers, 2010; Jackson & Lilleker, 2011; Bulovsky, 
2018). Graham et al. (2014, see especially pp. 697-698) provide a useful general breakdown of issues 
that matter here: a political tweet can be classified in terms of whether it is simply a ‘broadcast’ 
message reporting on a politician’s activities or viewpoints or whether it involves some sort of 
‘interaction’ (e.g. is a reply to another user or makes some kind of attempt to engage in a discourse). 
Empirical research has consistently critiqued politicians for engaging with Twitter in a more 
broadcast style, and make less use of its interactive features (see Jungherr, 2017, p. 76; Ross & 
Bürger, 2014), with larger political forces apparently even less likely to interact (Heiss, Schmuck & 
Matthes, 2018), thus missing out on the potential of the platform. ‘Populist’ parties are also, 
apparently, less likely to engage in interaction (Jacobs & Spierings, 2018). When there is some kind 
of interactivity and engagement, it typically takes place with other politicians, especially members of 
the same party (see Livne et al. 2011). However, the finding is not necessarily consistent for all 
parties: Heiss et al. (2018) have argued that politicians from smaller parties were more likely to 
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directly interact with and respond to users. This seems important because the potential influence of 
the direct mobilisation mechanism as described above might depend at least partly on the extent to 
which politicians are actually seen as responsive to individual voters, and indeed literature on the 
subject has suggested that using a more interactive style offers a ‘vote dividend’ (Koc-Michalska, 
Lilleker & Smith, 2016). This leads us to our final hypothesis:      
H5: Politicians with more interactive tweeting strategies will benefit more from campaigning on 
Twitter 
3 Methods 
Our study is based on data from the 2015 and 2017 UK national elections. In these elections, 
political parties compete by fielding candidates in 649 individual electoral districts, known as 
“constituencies”, which each contain approximately 70,000 people who are registered to vote3. In 
our dataset, we include all candidates who stood for any party that managed to win at least one seat 
in at least one of the two elections we observed4.  We did not include the 18 Northern Irish 
constituencies, where parties from the rest of the UK do not typically campaign and where electoral 
politics has a local focus that is mostly independent from national political dynamics, hence our 
geographic focus is limited to 631 constituencies in England, Scotland and Wales. In total, our 
dataset contains almost 6,000 candidate observations campaigning for one of seven different parties 
in one of these constituencies in at least one of the two elections. The dependent variable for our 
study is the percentage of overall votes gained by each candidate in the constituency in which they 
were competing. The main method employed in this paper, consistent with a variety of other studies 
of the campaign effects of digital technologies (Kruikemeier, 2014; Koc-Michalska et al., 2016; Van 
Noort et al., 2016), is to observe the extent to which effort put into Twitter by candidates in a 
political campaign correlates with these vote outcomes. 
A subset of these politicians campaigned in both elections, something which allows us to 
treat the data as a pseudo-panel dataset. This means that, in addition to running cross sectional and 
pooled models, we also run first difference models observing change in outcomes within individual 
candidates (Wooldridge, 2012, p. 279). This approach has been used previously in studies of 
campaign effects as a way of eliminating (time-invariant) unobserved variables such as charisma 
which are of obvious importance and yet very difficult to measure (see e.g. Levitt, 1994). Of course, 
it is worth noting that the subset of politicians who campaigned in both elections is biased towards 
those who are more successful: 52% of those who returned in 2017 had won their seat in 2015, 
whilst the rest typically scored much higher than the average candidate in the 2015 election. 
However, the fact that we can run models on two waves of cross sectional data and take a panel 
approach means that overall we are positioned to offer a strong test of the potential impact of 
Twitter on voting outcomes.     
Our main independent variables are based on patterns of candidate activity on Twitter. This 
is a highly-used social media platform, which had approximately 14.8 million UK based users in 2015, 
a number which rose to 16.4 million in 2017 (Statista, 2017) . This is relatively large considering the 
UK had a population of around 65 million in this time period, of which around 45 million were 
eligible to vote (The Electoral Commission 2016). Users on the platform can distribute short 
messages, known as “tweets”, to individuals who have chosen to  follow them. They can also “reply” 
to messages created by others, and “retweet” messages created by others (which involves 
                                                           
3 There are actually 650 constituencies in total, but one is dedicated to the ceremonial position of the “speaker 
of the House”, a politician who organises the business of parliament and hence who traditionally runs 
unopposed. The exact number of voters varies slightly by constituency. For details, see: 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/elections/electoralregistration/bulletins/electoralst
atisticsforuk/2014-05-01    
4 These parties were: the Conservative Party, the Labour Party, the Scottish National Party, the Liberal 
Democrats, Plaid Cymru, the Green Party and the UK Independence Party.  
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rebroadcasting someone else’s tweet to your own followers).  The distinguishing feature of the 
platform is that it is highly public, meaning that anyone can choose to follow anyone else. This focus 
on only one social media platform does create a limitation of course, as we do not know how Twitter 
activity may correlate with activity on other social platforms. We will return to this point in the 
discussion.  
We collected a number of variables from Twitter. We will describe each of these in turn 
here, according to the hypothesis they are designed to test. 
H1: Twitter Usage 
To address H1, we collected basic metrics about the candidate’s usage of Twitter. In order to 
collect data on candidate Twitter activity, we made use of data from the civic technology 
organisation DemocracyClub5, which released information on the Twitter usernames of UK political 
candidates. We conducted an independent verification of the data, which overall was found to be 
93% accurate.6 Using the list of candidates provided by this organisation, we first recorded whether 
political candidates in our dataset had a Twitter account or not. For those that did, we tracked 
activity on Twitter7 from the day after official candidate registration closed up to and including the 
day before each election, a period of 24 days in total.8 This allowed us to record the number of 
contributions candidates made to the platform during the campaign period (including replies, 
retweets and ‘original’ tweets. 
H2: Audience Size 
 We address the audience size hypothesis in two ways. First, we estimated the proportion of 
internet users in each constituency, making use of figures generated by Blank, Graham and Calvino 
(2017). Appendix A1.1 contains further details of this estimation. As the estimations are based on 
census data (which is only updated once every decade), the indicators are the same for the 2015 and 
2017 waves, which means that we cannot use this variable in our first difference models. As a 
second approach to measuring audience size, we also recorded the number of followers the 
candidate had during the campaign window. This number was observed each time the candidate 
sent a tweet (if the candidate sent multiple tweets, the final observed follower count was used).  The 
internet usage statistics and follower counts allow us to address hypothesis 2. 
H3: Party Size 
To address H3, we recorded the average vote share of each party in the electoral 
constituencies in which they competed. We use average share per constituency rather than total 
national vote share because regional parties such as the Scottish National Party performed very well 
where they were competing, but achieved only a fractional vote share overall. This variable is also 
used as a control variable in our first difference models, which allows us to distinguish between the 
impact of the individual candidate and the party at large. 
                                                           
5 See: https://democracyclub.org.uk  
6 The validation was based on a random sample of the data (116 observations). For each observation in the 
sample, one of the authors made use of both the Twitter search function and Google to determine if the 
candidate in question had a Twitter username, and if so to look at if it had been correctly recorded in the 
dataset.   
7 In 2015, we collected the data using a commercial partner, Data Sift, which ensured that we did not 
encounter any rate limit issues. In 2017, we had elevated access to the Twitter Streaming API (Application 
Programming Interface) and again were able to collect the data without any rate limit issues. For both 
elections, we looked up the numeric ids corresponding to candidates’ screennames using the Twitter RESTful 
API and used these to track their activity as incumbent MPs often change their Twitter usernames during the 
campaign period (during which they are not allowed to refer to themselves as MPs). 
8 In 2015 this ran from April 13th to May 6th, whilst in 2017 this ran from May 16th to June 7th.  
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H4: Network Heterogeneity 
 To address H4, we recorded the number of times the candidate was ‘mentioned’ on Twitter 
(i.e. the number of times a tweet was sent containing the politician’s username) , and then calculated 
the proportion of these ‘mentioners’ who also mentioned a candidate in another party, which 
provides an estimate of the political heterogeneity of the candidate’s audience (following a similar 
logic to Bright 2018).  
H5: Interactivity 
 Our interactivity hypothesis was addressed in two ways. First, we divided candidate tweeting 
activity into three major types: replies, retweets and ‘original tweets’. We assume that the amount 
of replies is indicative of the amount of interaction a politician engages in. However, it is also 
possible that the original tweets have significant patterns of interactivity within them. Hence, as a 
second step, we fit an unsupervised topic models on all original tweets using non-negative matrix 
factorization (Gillis, 2014) for each party in each wave of observation. We selected the number of 
topics for each party using the method proposed by Greene, O’Callaghan & Cunningham (2014). One 
author of the study then coded each topic in each party as being related to either ‘broadcasting’ or 
‘interacting’, based on the codebook developed by Graham et al. (2014). This process was repeated 
by a second author, and percent agreement was found to be 88%, with a Krippendorff’s Alpha of 
0.69. We then use our coded topic model to assign each tweet by each candidate into a topic, and 
hence calculate the amount of interacting and broadcasting communication the candidate engages 
in (a fuller explanation of the topic model process is provided in appendix A1.2).  
Control Variables 
We also collected a number of control variables which we thought could be potential 
confounds of the Twitter effect. We included the party of the candidates themselves, whether they 
were currently an incumbent Member of Parliament [MP] or not in either the 2015 or 2017 
elections, and the amount of money spent during the election campaign. Campaign spending data 
was made available by the UK Electoral Commission, a public body that monitors the conduct of 
elections9. Our spending data covers all money spent during the campaign period immediately 
before the election. However, at the time of writing the 2017 spending data did not include a 
handful of candidates who had yet to finish their returns. Hence models which include 2017 
spending data do not include these observations.  
4 Results 
Selected descriptive statistics from the dataset are presented in Table 1 (full summary 
statistics for all variables are available in appendix A2). There are around 3,000 observations in both 
waves of observation, or around five per constituency (although we have included candidates from 
seven parties, not all of them field a candidate in each constituency). The lower overall number of 
observations in 2017 is largely driven by a considerable decrease in both Green Party and UKIP 
candidates. Twitter use is relatively widespread in both cohorts, though it drops from 76% in 2015 to 
63% in 2017. This may be explained by the rushed nature of the 2017 election: many candidates 
were picked at the last minute, and hence had less time to organise social media profiles. Those 
candidates who did have a Twitter account made quite frequent use of the network in the campaign 
period, sending on average more than 150 tweets both waves of observation (though usage levels 
decreased slightly between 2017 and 2015). The majority of these were typically retweets, with 
interactive tweets being the least common type of communication, supporting work which has 
claimed that politicians mostly engage in ‘broadcasting’ activity.  
 
                                                           
9 Available from: https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/find-information-by-subject/elections-and-
referendums/past-elections-and-referendums/uk-general-elections/candidate-election-spending  
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 2015  2017 2015 and 2017 
 Mean (standard deviation) / Mean delta (SD delta) 
Tweets sent     169.65 (243)     152.94 (248)      -18.87 (183) 
Interacting Tweets         2.98 (10)         7.88 (17)         4.50 (12) 
Broadcasting Tweets       48.21 (75)       43.63 (83)       -1.41 (68) 
Retweets       85.19 (155)       84.92 (168)       -4.81 (124) 
Replies       37.52 (71)       23.82 (58)     -15.51 (53) 
Followers 4,005.26 (26,201) 8,261.67 (39,366) 7,835 (43,689) 
    
Number of candidates  3,172 2,826 1,062 
Candidates with Twitter account 2,398 (76%) 1,786 (63%) 822 (77%) 
 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics. Averages include only those candidates with a Twitter account 
Having a Twitter account was strongly and statistically significantly correlated with campaign 
spending and incumbency in both waves of observation; these factors were also correlated with the 
level of usage of these accounts and the amount of followers they have (though the effect sizes were 
relatively small in the case of usage levels). This offers support to the ‘normalisation’ thesis: 
established and well-resourced political forces seem to use the technology more and also attract 
more followers.  
A final descriptively interest result concerns the geographic distribution of the activity of 
those mentioning the candidate, which we base on the portion of the tweets within our dataset 
came with latitude and longitude information attached. In both years an average of just over 30% of 
mentions of candidates came from their own constituency. This indicates that, while the majority of 
Twitter activity concerning candidates takes place outside their constituencies, a considerable 
proportion nevertheless takes place amongst people who could actually be eligible to vote for the 
candidate in question. Our data also allows us to perform a similar procedure for the candidate’s 
own tweets: interestingly, we found that less than 50% of candidate tweets came from within their 
own constituency during this campaign period. However, we should note of course that only a small, 
non-representative subset of Twitter users enable the geolocation feature of the platform which 
allows us to address where the contribution comes from (Graham, Hale & Gaffney, 2014). Hence 
these estimates must be treated with caution.  
Our analytical exercise consists of a set of linear models of the relationship between Twitter 
use and vote outcomes, contained in Table 2 and 3. All fitted models were analysed with standard 
goodness of fit diagnostic tests for OLS models10. These tests highlighted two main potential 
concerns with the fit: evidence of heteroscedasticity and a group of around 150 high influence 
observations (the exact amount varying depending on the model being fitted)11. These problems 
                                                           
10 In particular, variance inflation factors were inspected for evidence of multicollinearity, Cook’s distance was 
calculated for all observations in order to identify high influence data points, plots of variables versus fitted 
values were inspected to check the general assumption of a linear relationship between dependent and 
independent variables, and a Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity was conducted.  
11 The majority of these observations were parliamentary candidates who were campaigning in “safe” 
parliamentary constituencies, which are characterised by very high levels of concentration of voters for one 
party. In these safe seats, parliamentary candidates can score very high levels of vote share with little 
campaigning effort. Hence, these observations deviated considerably from the overall fit of the model. This 
impact was sometimes compounded when an MP retired and a new candidate took their place. In this 
situation, the new candidate is not treated as an “incumbent” by the model, but has many of the advantages 
of being an incumbent. 
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were not resolved by log transformation of variables, so two further steps were taken in response. 
First, coefficient estimates, measures of statistical significance and estimates of adjusted R2 were all 
computed by bootstrapping (R=5,000). Second, robust linear regressions were also estimated for all 
models. The results of the robust regressions were the same as the original OLS estimates (with one 
exception which is noted below). Hence we have reported the original OLS estimates to facilitate 
interpretation.  
The models in Table 2 seek to tackle our fundamental question (hypothesis 1), of whether 
using Twitter increases vote share outcomes. Models 1.1 – 1.3 are cross-sectional, with the 
relationship between Twitter use and vote outcomes tested on both waves of our data, and hence in 
the table estimates are reported for both 2015 and 2017. Model 1.1 simply addresses the 
relationship between having a Twitter account and final vote share outcome. In both years Twitter 
use is positively associated with vote outcomes, though the overall adjusted R2 of the models is small 
(0.04 in 2015 and 0.09 in 2017). Model 1.2 adds in our control variables: spending data, incumbency, 
and the party of the candidate. The party variable is not reported to save room, but full models can 
be found in appendix A3.1. We find the strength of the Twitter ‘effect’ decreases when compared to 
Model 1.1, but the variable itself remains significant (whilst adjusted R2 increases considerably). In 
both models the effect of having a Twitter account is comparable with the effect of increasing 
spending (a little more in 2015, a little less in 2017). The absolute magnitude of the effect is modest: 
those with a Twitter account were between 1 and 2 percentage points better off in terms of vote 
share.  
Model 1.3 is restricted to the subset of observations for candidates who did have a Twitter 
account, with the main independent variable being the amount of times they sent messages from 
this account during the observation window (log transformed). These messages include all original 
tweets, replies and retweets. The term is again positive and statistically significant, and remains 
modest but roughly comparable with spending: increasing the number of tweets sent by a factor of 
10 increases vote share by around 1 percentage point. Model 1.4 pools all observations which had a 
Twitter account, and includes a dummy variable for whether the wave was 2017 or 2015 as well as 
an interaction term between the wave and the number of tweets sent. The Twitter term remains 
statistically significant, however the interaction term is not, indicating that the effect of Twitter in 
2015 and 2017 is roughly comparable.   
Model 1.5 offers our strongest test of the impact of Twitter on vote share, using a first 
difference model on the politicians who competed in both 2015 and 2017 and who had a Twitter 
account. All variables are now measured as differences between the 2015 and 2017 waves. The 
party term is the average vote share of the party overall, per constituency, differenced between 
2015 and 2017: hence the impact of changes in the overall performance of individual parties is 
controlled for. Even in this strong test, increasing Twitter use between the two waves made a 
difference for politicians: candidates who increased their Twitter activity by a factor of 10 in 2017 
typically improved on their 2015 score by just over half a percentage point. Interestingly, the 
amount of money spent is no longer statistically significant under this framework. This provides 
strong evidence that Twitter use does genuinely make a difference (though again the size of the 
effect is modest).  
 The second part of our analysis tackles hypothesis 2 to hypothesis 5, and seeks to 
understand the conditions whereby politicians gain more benefit from Twitter use. Table 3 contains 
linear models addressing different aspects of these hypotheses, following the same logic as Table 2: 
each model is tested on 2015 and 2017 data, and then as a first difference model. Each model is a 
duplication of model 1.3 above, with an added interaction term between the number of tweets sent 
and a new variable of interest. Only the coefficient for the interaction term is reported to save space  
(full models can be found in appendix A3.2). The number of observations fluctuates slightly in each 
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model due to small amounts of missing data. A summary of the reasons for these fluctuations can be 
found in appendix A3.3.   
 
  Dependent variable: vote share  
 Model 1.1 Model 1.2 Model 1.3 
 2015 2017 2015 2017 2015 2017 
Uses Twitter  8.68 *** 13.43 ***    1.82 ***   1.06 **   
#Tweets (log10)       0.96 ***   0.85 *** 
Spending (log10)      0.95 ***    2.49 ***   0.96 ***   3.68 *** 
Incumbent MP   23.35 *** 25.37 *** 22.62 *** 24.17 *** 
Party   Included Included Included Included 
Observations 3,172 2,826 3,172 2,807 2,398 1,776 
Adjusted R2 0.04 0.09 0.79 0.88 0.78 0.87 
       
 Model 1.4  Model 1.5 Dependent variable:  Δ vote share 
#Tweets (log10)   0.74 **  Δ Tweets (log10)     0.57 *  
Spending (log10)   1.62 ***  Δ Spending (log10)     0.03   
Incumbent MP 22.66 ***  Δ Incumbent     1.89 ***  
Party Included  Δ Party Vote Share     1.09 ***  
2017 Wave 0.40      
2017 Interaction 0.54       
Observations 4,174    818  
Adjusted R2 0.81    0.60  
  * p < 0.05 ; ** p < 0.01; *** p< 0.001 
 
Table 2: OLS regressions of the relationship between Twitter use and vote share outcomes. 
Coefficients, significance levels and R2 calculated using bootstrapping (percentile method, 5,000 
repetitions). A categorical party variable is included but not reported in models 1.2-1.4 (full models 
can be found in the appendix)  
 Hypotheses 2 concerns the effect of audience size. We address this in models 2.1 and 2.2. 
Model 2.1 incorporates an interaction term between our measure of internet use in a constituency, 
which we expect to broadly correlate with Twitter use. The term is statistically insignificant in both 
models. We cannot run a first difference model for internet use, as our measure is based on census 
data and is hence is identical for 2015 and 2017. Model 2.2 makes use of an interaction between the 
number of followers a politician has on Twitter and their tweeting activity. The term is again 
insignificant in both waves, and also in the difference model. Hence overall there is no supportive 
evidence for hypothesis 2.  
 Hypothesis 3 addressed the normalisation versus equalisation thesis. This is tackled in model 
2.3, which incorporates an interaction term for the size of the politician’s party, measured as the 
average vote share achieved by candidates in that party (note that the dummy variables for the 
party itself are of course dropped). There is strong evidence that party size makes a difference: the 
term is significant in 2015 and in the difference model. However it is positive, meaning that we 
reject the notion that small parties benefit more. Indeed, larger parties seem to do better. This is 
evidence for ‘normalisation’ theory. Of course, we should highlight that there are only seven parties 
in the study, and hence the variation we have on this variable is limited. Multi-country research 
would be needed to fully confirm this finding.  
 Hypothesis 4 relates to the ‘echo chamber’ effect, stating that politicians with more diverse 
audiences should gain more from tweeting. We tackle this in model 2.4, which interacts the 
percentage of ‘multi-party’ mentioners that a politician has with the volume of tweets they produce. 
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The term is strongly significant and negatively signed in the 2015 wave, but is not significant in the 
2017 wave or in the difference model. Furthermore, the direction of effect is reversed in the 
difference model when compared with the cross sectional models. Therefore, there is overall little 
evidence to support hypothesis 4.    
 Hypothesis 5, finally, concerns the extent to which politicians engage with Twitter in an 
interactive manner. Model 2.5 looks at this by breaking down Twitter activity into the three major 
types of tweet: replies (where the user responds directly to a comment from another user), retweets 
(where the user rebroadcasts a message from another user) and what we have labelled here as 
‘original tweets’ which include everything else. There is no evidence that replies have more of an 
impact than any other kind of tweet. There is a little evidence by contrast that original tweets make 
a difference, with the term significant in 2017.  
 Model 2.6 splits the original tweets produced by the politician into ‘interacting’ and 
‘broadcasting’ categories using the results of our topic model, as outlined above. Here, surprisingly, 
there is strong evidence that broadcasting tweets make the most difference, with the term 
statistically significant in both 2015 and the first difference model. The result is reversed in 2017, 
though this finding is not significant in the robust regression model.  
 Dependent variable: vote share for 2015 and 2017 models, difference for FD models 
 H2: Audience Size H3: Norm. vs. Equalisation 
 Model 2.1 Model 2.2 Model 2.3 
Term (Δ for FD models) 2015 2017 FD 2015 2017 FD 2015 2017 FD 
Internet Use * Tweets (log10) 0.26 0.37  NA       
Followers (log10) * Tweets (log10)    0.73 0.87  -0.53    
Avg. Party Share * Tweets (log10)       0.05** 0.02 0.09* 
Observations 2,398 1,776 NA 2,274 1,569 723 2,398 1,776 818 
Adjusted R2 0.78 0.87 NA 0.79 0.88 0.60 0.77 0.87 0.69 
          
 H4: Echo Chamber H5: Interactivity 
 Model 2.4 Model 2.5 Model 2.6 
 2015 2017 FD 2015 2017 FD 2015 2017 FD 
Perc. MP * Tweets (log10) -8.64*** -1.76 0.83       
Original Tweets    0.69   1.26*  0.72    
Replies    0.43   0.47  0.62     
Retweets    0.12 -0.55 -0.52    
Interacting        0.60 1.81** -0.43 
Broadcasting       1.15** 0.29  1.33** 
Observations 2,319 1,712 788 2,398 1,776 818 2,199 1,523 692 
Adjusted R2 0.79 0.87 0.68 0.78 0.87 0.69 0.77 0.87 0.59 
 * p < 0.05 ; ** p < 0.01; *** p< 0.001 
Table 3: Further OLS Models Terms for incumbency and spending are included in all models but not 
reported. A party term is also included in all models apart from 2.3. Grey shading indicates a result 
which was not significant in the robust regressions.   
5 Discussion 
 This study has provided, to our knowledge, the strongest empirical test yet of the link 
between political campaigning on Twitter and vote share outcomes. The results show considerable 
evidence that there is a connection between political Twitter activity and votes: a variety of different 
model specifications were tested, with relevant control variables for spending and party 
membership, on two waves of panel data, pooled time series and first difference models. In all of 
these a positive, statistically significant correlation was found. However, the results were also 
unanimous in suggesting that the impact of Twitter use is small in absolute terms. In our cross 
sectional models, candidates that had a Twitter account typically had vote shares around 1-2 
percentage points higher than those who did not (see model 1.2). Amongst those that did have an 
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account, a 10-fold increase in the volume of tweets sent would be needed to generate a 1 
percentage point increase in vote share (model 1.3). In our first difference model the effect was 
event smaller: a 10-fold increase in tweets sent would generate just over half a percentage point of 
vote share increase.  
The relative size of the effect should be taken into account. Twitter use was comparable 
with the effect of campaign spending in our cross sectional models, and outstrips it in our 
differenced regressions. It is also worth highlighting that modest increase in vote share may also be 
significant in a close race, of which there were many in our data: around 14% of the electoral 
competitions which form the basis of our study were won by a margin of less than 5 percentage 
points, and 4% of them were won by a margin of less than 1 percentage point. However, considering 
the small size of the effect, and also that the effort of producing new tweets is essentially constant 
regardless of how many are produced, the results suggest that the best strategy for a political 
candidate is a limited amount of engagement with the platform (say, between 100 and 1,000 tweets 
sent during the campaign period). 
We also addressed the circumstances under which political twitter use was particularly 
effective. We found little evidence that the size of a candidate’s Twitter audience made a difference, 
or that the heterogeneity of that audience had an impact. We also found little evidence that making 
use of interactive conversation strategies was impactful: indeed there was evidence that engaging 
with Twitter in ‘broadcast’ mode was more helpful. This challenges existing work which has 
suggested that interactive Tweeting patterns generate a vote dividend, and indeed the large body of 
literature which has criticised politicians for not engaging in social media in a more interactive 
fashion. There was also good evidence that larger parties benefitted more from using the 
technology, contradicting the ‘equalisation’ thesis whilst supporting the ‘normalisation’ thesis.  
One way of summarising these interaction effects is that they lend weight to the idea that 
campaigning on Twitter is more likely to produce indirect benefits rather than direct ones. That is to 
say, use of Twitter may have an impact because it stimulates coverage in media outlets, or because 
it energises opinion leaders, but not because it creates direct connections between politicians and 
voters. This would explain why the size and nature of the politician’s audience does not make a 
difference, nor do their attempts to interact with these audiences. Rather, broadcast tweets which 
might lend themselves to further media coverage are positioned to generate an impact. This would 
also explain why larger parties benefit more: following scholars in the normalisation tradition, we 
speculate that the existing resource advantages enjoyed by established parties also translate into 
this new technology. This might include more access to professional campaign staff who can advise 
on the use of new media technology, or a greater likelihood that their Twitter activities are covered 
by journalists who perceive them as more important.  
 It is worth concluding by highlighting weaknesses in the study, and thus pointing the way for 
future research. We would highlight two of these in particular. First, we address only one social 
media platform in this paper. We do not know the extent to which the use of Twitter correlates with 
use of other types of social media (such as Facebook and Snapchat), hence we are unable to say to 
what extent it is Twitter itself which makes the difference, as compared to other platforms. Future 
work that studied campaign effort on multiple platforms would be highly valuable. Second, we treat 
observations in our dataset as if they are the result of separate, independent electoral campaigns. 
This is, of course, not the case. Candidates face each other in constituencies: two brilliant campaigns 
might cancel each other out, and hence produce no result in our data. There are also co-ordinated 
national campaigns that take place containing social media elements. Though our party variables 
and first difference regressions address these problems to an extent, they cannot resolve them fully. 
Only a field experiment could truly address these deficiencies. Absent this, however, we believe that 
this study is the strongest treatment yet of the effect of active political campaigning on social media.   
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Appendix 
This appendix is divided into three parts: in section A1 we give full descriptive statistics for our 
dataset; in section A2 we provide further details on how some of our variables were operationalised; 
and in section A3 we report in full models which are only described in abridged form in the body text 
of the paper.  
A1 Variable Operationalisation 
 In this section of the appendix, we provide more details on how our constituency level 
internet use indicator is operationalised, and the approach we take to constructing and coding our 
topic models.  
A1.1 Constituency Level Internet Use Indicators  
 Our constituency level internet use indicators are based on the data released by Blank, 
Graham & Calvino (2017). This paper used small area estimation to provide a measure of internet 
use at the “output area” level, which is a small geographical area designed specifically for use with 
the census which typically contains around 120 households. There are 227,759 of these output areas 
in England, Scotland and Wales. The census provides lookup tables which map these output areas to 
parliamentary constituencies. We use these lookup tables to provide a population weighted average 
of internet usage by constituency on the basis of the output area measures. In cases where output 
areas overlapped with two or more constituencies, we assigned these areas to the constituency with 
which they had the largest overlap.   
A1.2 Topic Models 
 In order to characterise the type of communication activity which political candidates 
engage in during the campaign period on Twitter, we make use of a series of topic models, a 
technique which is increasingly used in communication research (Maier et al., 2018). The approach 
allows us to extract a discrete number of general topics from the textual data within candidate 
tweets. The advantage of unsupervised topic models over methods such as content analysis and 
supervised machine learning is that they do not require a large amount of up front data, and 
therefore they make tractable the process of characterising the communication style of thousands of 
different political candidates. We will briefly describe the process we followed to produce our topic 
models here. 
 The input into a topic model is a ‘document-term matrix’, which is simply a matrix whereby 
each row is an individual document (an individual tweet in our case) and each column is a word 
which appears in the entire corpus of tweets. The entry d-tij specifies the amount of times the term tj 
appears in the document d i. We only made use of ‘original’ tweets in our corpus (i.e. we do not 
include replies and retweets). We pre-process our corpus of tweets to remove common ‘stopwords’ 
(frequently occurring words such as ‘and’, ‘the’, ‘it’ etc. which we assume have little value in 
classification terms). We also ‘lemmatize’ all remaining words in the corpus, returning each word to 
its original base or lemma (such that, for example the words ‘angry’ and ‘angrier’ would be reduced 
to the same term, angry). We then limit our model to the 1,000 most frequently occurring words in 
the corpus, on the basis that extremely infrequent words are unlikely to be of use in distinguishing 
topics. Finally, we convert these term frequency scores using tf-idf weighting, which applies a 
stronger weight to terms which are less common across the corpus of the documents as a whole. 
From this document-term matrix, two further matrices are estimated: a term-topic matrix (which 
specifies the likelihood of individual terms appearing in a given topic) and a document-topic matrix 
(which specifies the likelihood of a given document, or tweet, belonging to a particular topic). These 
matrices were estimated using the non-negative matrix factorization [NMF] technique (see e.g. Gillis, 
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2014). We used NMF rather than the slightly more popular latent dirichlet allocation because NMF 
allows us to work with fractional tf-idf scores.   
 A key consideration in topic models is choosing the appropriate number of topics, k, which 
must be specified by the researcher (Maier et al., 2018). The ideal value of k is one that allows the 
full variation of different communication styles to be captured without creating arbitrary divisions 
between groups of documents that are in practice quite similar. We chose to fit an individual topic 
model for each party in each year, on the basis that different parties might choose different 
communication strategies for their campaigns. To select the appropriate number of topics for each 
campaign year, we made use of the stability analysis technique proposed by Greene, O’Callaghan & 
Cunningham (2014), which is adapted to the particular case of NMF and involves analysing the 
extent to which the topic-term matrix is robust to random perturbations of the input data for 
different values of k. For all parties in each of the two waves of our data, we tested all values of k 
between 5 and 15 against 10 randomly drawn samples of 80% of the data. We then picked the value 
of k with the highest level of stability for each party (in the end all values of k were in the range 5-7).  
 Once we had created each party-year level topic model, we then labelled each topic in terms 
of its style of communication: where it could be conceived of as largely one-way communication 
(broadcasting) or whether it attempted to engage in some form of two-way communication 
(interacting). Our definitions of these two communication types come from the codebook proposed 
in Graham et al. (2014, pp.697-698), where they label a number of different types of communication 
as falling into one of these two overarching categories. The definitions we use are set out in table 
A1. 
Broadcasting Behaviours Definition 
Updating Posting updates on recent candidate activity, 
e.g. attendance at events or doorstep 
campaigning 
Promoting Tweets specifically promoting the skills/ability 
of the candidate or party 
Critiquing Tweets criticising other parties or candidates 
Information disseminating Dissemination of news reports or informational 
links 
Own / party stance  Tweets where the candidate takes a position on 
a specific policy area 
  
Interacting beahviours  
Debating  Tweets where the candidate directly debates 
with opposition candidates or members of the 
general public 
Acknowledging Tweets where the candidate thanks people or 
acknowledges support 
Organizing / mobilizing Direct efforts to organise offline or online 
activity 
Advice giving / helping Candidate efforts to help people in individual 
constituencies 
Consulting Requesting public input on a given issue  
 
Table A1. Topic codebook. Adapted from Graham et al., 2014, pp.703-707. 
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The coding process itself was based on both the term-topic matrix and the document-topic 
matrix. For each topic, we extracted the 10 most probable terms and the 5 most probable tweets. 
One of the authors of the study then used the content of these terms and tweets to make a coding 
decision. A second author independently performed the process, producing a Krippendorrf’s alpha of 
0.69 (percent agreement of 88%). Having labelled all topics as either broadcasting or interacting, we 
were then able to label all tweets in the corpus as either broadcasting or interacting as well, on the 
basis of selecting the most probable topic for each tweet.   
A2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Table A2: Descriptive Statistics 
  
Categorical variables freq % freq % freq %
Total observations 3,172 100 2,826 100 1062 100
Incumbent MP 540 17% 597 21% Inc. 2015, Chal. 2017 30 3%
Challenger MP 2,632 83% 2,229 79% No Change 875 81%
Chal. 2015, Inc. 2017 157 16%
Conservative Party 631 20% 631 22% Conservative Party 359 35%
Green Party 567 18% 459 16% Green Party 105 10%
Labour Party 631 20% 631 22% Labour Party 285 31%
Liberal Democrats 631 20% 629 22% Liberal Democrats 191 17%
Plaid Cymru 40 1% 40 1% Plaid Cymru 3 0%
Scottish National Party 59 2% 59 2% Scottish National Party 46 4%
UK Independence Party 613 19% 377 13% UK Independence Party 73 4%
Had Twitter 2,398 76% 1,786 63% Had Twitter 822 77%
Did not have Twitter 774 24% 1,040 37% Did not have Twitter 240 23%
Numeric variables mean sd mean sd mean sd
Vote Share 19.73 17.79 22.17 22.20 Share 2017 - 2015 2.79 8.31
Internet Use in Cons. 0.78 0.06 0.78 0.06
Numeric variables (those with Twitter account only)
Tweets 169.65 242.72 152.94 248.53 Tweets 2017 - 2015 -18.87 183.33
Spending 3877.99 4586.52 4709.97 4676.83 Spending 2017 - 2015 1061.48 3818.90
Followers 4005.26 26201.59 8261.67 39366.16 Followers 2017 - 2015 7834.59 43688.96
Party Av. Share 19.73 13.63 22.17 18.68 Party Av. 2017 - 2015 2.97 6.51
% Multi Party Mentioners 0.71 0.17 0.84 0.11 %MP 2017 - 2015 0.16 0.17
Original Tweets 46.95 76.20 44.19 84.40 Orig. 2017 - 2015 1.45 71.47
Replies 37.52 70.91 23.82 58.05 Replies 2017 - 2015 -15.51 52.61
Retweets 85.19 154.94 84.92 167.86 Retweets 2017 - 2015 -4.81 124.24
Broadcast Tweets 48.21 74.76 43.63 83.07 Broadcast 2017 - 2015 -1.41 68.21
Interacting Tweets 2.98 10.33 7.88 17.40 Interacting 2017 - 2015 4.50 11.98
2015 2017 2015 - 2017 Panel
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A3 Models 
 This section contains full models from tables 2 and 3.  
A3.1 Full Models from Table 2 
 
 
Table A3: Full models from table 2. Conservative Party is the reference level for the party variable.  
2015 Models
Coef Coef Coef
Uses Twitter 8.68 7.39 9.94 1.82 1.23 2.42
#Tweets (log10) 0.96 0.52 1.41
Spending (log10) 0.95 0.72 1.18 0.96 0.68 1.26
Incumbent MP 23.35 22.28 24.43 22.62 21.42 23.78
Green Party -21.17 -22.29 -20.04 -22.00 -23.23 -20.76
Labour Party -2.61 -3.88 -1.31 -2.74 -4.12 -1.44
Liberal Democrats -19.63 -20.75 -18.52 -19.74 -20.97 -18.53
Plaid Cymru - The Party of Wales -14.88 -17.44 -12.05 -15.05 -18.04 -11.72
Scottish National Party (SNP) 20.28 17.69 22.79 19.54 17.01 22.02
UK Independence Party (UKIP) -11.98 -13.17 -10.78 -12.67 -14.01 -11.34
Adjusted R2 0.04 0.79 0.78
N 3,172 3,172 2,398
2017 Models
Coef Coef Coef
Uses Twitter 13.44 11.94 14.97 1.06 0.44 1.66
#Tweets (log10) 0.85 0.40 1.32
Spending (log10) 2.49 2.21 2.79 3.68 3.15 4.29
Incumbent MP 25.37 24.29 26.49 24.18 22.87 25.45
Green Party -23.30 -24.36 -22.23 -22.73 -24.16 -21.26
Labour Party 3.46 2.35 4.53 3.60 2.35 4.86
Liberal Democrats -21.44 -22.60 -20.28 -21.03 -22.47 -19.56
Plaid Cymru - The Party of Wales -19.73 -21.74 -17.54 -18.91 -21.46 -16.22
Scottish National Party (SNP) -16.08 -18.07 -13.93 -16.09 -18.47 -13.31
UK Independence Party (UKIP) -22.40 -23.49 -21.31 -22.44 -24.05 -20.83
Adjusted R2 0.09 0.88 0.87
N 2,826 2,807 1,776 
Pooled and First Difference Model
Coef Coef
#Tweets (log10) 0.74 0.27 1.20 0.57 0.11 1.04
Spending (log10) 1.62 1.35 1.89 1.89 0.91 2.85
Incumbent MP 22.66 21.73 23.57 0.03 -0.25 0.31
Green Party -23.38 -24.35 -22.40 1.09 1.04 1.13
Labour Party 0.01 -1.00 1.03
Liberal Democrats -20.97 -21.95 -20.00
Plaid Cymru - The Party of Wales -17.41 -19.53 -15.25
Scottish National Party (SNP) 4.01 0.38 7.64
UK Independence Party (UKIP) -16.23 -17.39 -15.07
Year 0.39 -0.87 1.65
Year * #Tweets (log10) 0.55 -0.13 1.23
Adjusted R2 0.79 0.68 0.64 0.73
N 4,174 818
Model 1.3
95% CI95% CI
Model 1.4 Model 1.5
Model 1.3Model 1.2Model 1.1
95% CI95% CI 95% CI
95% CI 95% CI 95% CI
Δ Tweets (log10)
Δ Spending (log10)
Δ Incumbent
Δ Party Vote Share
Model 1.1 Model 1.2
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A3.2 Full Models from Table 3 
 
 
Table A4: Full models from table 3, 2015 wave. Conservative Party is the reference level for the party 
variable.  
 
 
 
 
2015 Models
Coef Coef Coef
#Tweets (log10) 0.89 0.44 1.35 -3.16 -5.13 -1.15 0.06 -0.51 0.60
Spending (log10) 0.98 0.69 1.27 0.75 0.45 1.05 0.96 0.67 1.24
Incumbent MP 22.62 21.47 23.77 17.63 16.24 18.99 21.65 20.56 22.79
Green Party -22.04 -23.29 -20.83 -21.16 -22.38 -19.95
Labour Party -2.71 -4.07 -1.34 -3.29 -4.60 -1.92
Liberal Democrats -19.82 -21.03 -18.60 -19.25 -20.48 -18.07
Plaid Cymru - The Party of Wales -14.47 -17.40 -11.13 -15.28 -18.19 -11.94
Scottish National Party (SNP) 19.88 17.37 22.36 17.88 15.23 20.39
UK Independence Party (UKIP) -12.68 -14.06 -11.35 -12.83 -14.18 -11.52
Internet Use in Cons. 0.06 -0.80 0.97
Internet Use in Cons. * #Tweets (log10) 0.25 -0.23 0.73
Followers (log10) 3.44 1.89 5.03
Followers (log10) * #Tweets (log10) 0.73 -0.04 1.45
Average Party Share 0.62 0.54 0.70
Average Party Share * #Tweets (log10) 0.05 0.01 0.09
Adjusted R2 0.78 0.79 0.77
N 2,398 2,274 2,398
2015 Models
Coef Coef Coef
#Tweets (log10) 6.69 4.57 8.73
Spending (log10) 0.89 0.60 1.18 0.96 0.68 1.25 0.96 0.64 1.28
Incumbent MP 21.74 20.59 22.88 22.61 21.44 23.74 22.27 21.10 23.44
Green Party -21.66 -22.89 -20.47 -22.02 -23.31 -20.79 -22.29 -23.81 -20.77
Labour Party -2.98 -4.31 -1.65 -2.75 -4.10 -1.38 -2.68 -4.25 -1.09
Liberal Democrats -18.60 -19.84 -17.41 -19.76 -21.03 -18.55 -19.72 -21.09 -18.37
Plaid Cymru - The Party of Wales -12.41 -15.29 -9.19 -15.12 -18.01 -11.78 -15.18 -18.20 -11.77
Scottish National Party (SNP) 22.19 19.61 24.70 19.47 16.88 22.03 19.37 16.50 22.23
UK Independence Party (UKIP) -10.53 -11.94 -9.17 -12.68 -14.05 -11.34 -12.84 -14.29 -11.38
% Multi-Party Mentioners 0.54 -3.56 4.35
% MP. Mens. * #Tweets (log10) -8.64 -11.19 -5.98
Replies (log10) 0.43 -0.41 1.29
Retweets (log10) 0.12 -0.61 0.84
Original tweets (log10) 0.69 -0.10 1.46
Interacting tweets (log10) 0.60 -0.67 1.87
Broadcasting tweets (log10) 1.15 0.33 1.96
Adjusted R2 0.79 0.78 0.77
N 2,319 2,398 2,199
Model 2.1 Model 2.2 Model 2.3
95% CI 95% CI 95% CI
Model 2.4 Model 2.5 Model 2.6
95% CI 95% CI 95% CI
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Table A5: Full models from table 3, 2017 wave. Conservative Party is the reference level for the party 
variable.  
2017 Models
Coef Coef Coef
#Tweets (log10) 0.88 0.42 1.35 -3.49 -6.37 -0.67 0.61 0.11 1.11
Spending (log10) 3.70 3.15 4.29 3.30 2.78 3.90 3.36 2.84 3.94
Incumbent MP 24.22 22.93 25.49 18.55 16.80 20.26 22.47 21.19 23.73
Green Party -22.69 -24.16 -21.28 -22.54 -24.03 -21.04
Labour Party 3.62 2.31 4.93 4.03 2.72 5.31
Liberal Democrats -21.02 -22.45 -19.57 -20.56 -22.01 -19.08
Plaid Cymru - The Party of Wales -18.95 -21.55 -16.27 -18.31 -21.06 -15.40
Scottish National Party (SNP) -16.06 -18.52 -13.43 -16.27 -18.44 -14.00
UK Independence Party (UKIP) -22.37 -24.02 -20.71 -23.09 -24.76 -21.35
Internet Use in Cons. -0.70 -1.53 0.08
Internet Use in Cons. * #Tweets (log10) 0.37 -0.06 0.81
Followers (log10) 3.27 1.21 5.29
Followers (log10) * #Tweets (log10) 0.87 -0.05 1.82
Average Party Share 0.62 0.57 0.67
Average Party Share * #Tweets (log10) 0.02 -0.01 0.04
Adjusted R2 0.87 0.88 0.85
N 1,776 1,569 1,776
2017 Models
Coef Coef Coef
#Tweets (log10) 2.23 -0.88 5.49
Spending (log10) 3.63 3.10 4.24 3.63 3.11 4.25 3.73 3.15 4.41
Incumbent MP 23.79 22.50 25.09 24.18 22.89 25.48 23.70 22.30 25.06
Green Party -22.62 -24.06 -21.18 -22.86 -24.29 -21.39 -24.25 -26.31 -22.20
Labour Party 3.86 2.58 5.14 3.46 2.19 4.75 3.81 2.42 5.17
Liberal Democrats -20.65 -22.10 -19.16 -21.16 -22.58 -19.68 -20.74 -22.36 -19.14
Plaid Cymru - The Party of Wales -18.63 -21.16 -16.01 -18.81 -21.36 -16.02 -19.54 -22.11 -16.92
Scottish National Party (SNP) -15.25 -17.78 -12.58 -16.26 -18.65 -13.66 -17.68 -20.07 -15.13
UK Independence Party (UKIP) -22.12 -23.71 -20.50 -22.62 -24.19 -21.00 -22.83 -24.67 -21.00
% Multi-Party Mentioners -3.60 -8.67 1.50
% MP. Mens. * #Tweets (log10) -1.76 -5.48 1.79
Replies (log10) 0.59 -0.36 1.52
Retweets (log10) -0.52 -1.36 0.34
Original tweets (log10) 1.26 0.23 2.27
Interacting tweets (log10) 1.81 0.42 3.20
Broadcasting tweets (log10) 0.31 -0.91 1.51
Adjusted R2 0.87 0.87 0.87
N 1,712 1,776 1,523
Model 2.3
95% CI 95% CI 95% CI
Model 2.4 Model 2.6
Model 2.1 Model 2.2
Model 2.5
95% CI 95% CI 95% CI
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Table A4: Full models from table 3, first difference models only. 
 
A3.3 Observations Per Model 
 Due to the way variables are calculated the number of observations changes slightly in the 
models in Table 3. Here we describe the reasons for these changes. 
Model 2.1: contains all observations which had a Twitter account and which had complete spending 
data.  
Model 2.2: Follower counts were observed when candidates sent a tweet. Hence the model contains 
all observations which had a Twitter account, complete spending data and sent at least one Tweet. 
Model 2.3: contains all observations which had a Twitter account and which had complete spending 
data. 
Model 2.4: contains all observations which had a Twitter account, complete spending data and who 
were mentioned at least once. The proportion of ‘multi-party’ mentioners could only be calculated if 
the candidate was mentioned at least once.  
Model 2.5: contains all observations which had a Twitter account and which had complete spending 
data. 
Model 2.6: contains all observations which had a Twitter account, complete spending data and sent 
at least one ‘original’ tweet (i.e. something that was not either a reply or a retweet). 
FD Models
All variables are 2015 - 2017 deltas Coef Coef Coef
#Tweets (log10) 0.98 0.12 1.87 0.33 -0.14 0.80
Incumbency 1.73 0.45 2.94 1.85 0.86 2.83
Spending (log10) 0.08 -0.23 0.40 0.03 -0.25 0.31
Average Party Share 1.10 1.05 1.15 1.10 1.05 1.14
Followers (log10) 0.12 -1.11 1.39
Followers (log10) * #Tweets (log10) -0.60 -2.19 0.81
Average Party Share * #Tweets (log10) 0.09 0.02 0.16
Adjusted R2 0.68 0.69
N 723 818
FD Models
All variables are 2015 - 2017 deltas Coef Coef Coef
#Tweets (log10) 0.35 -0.23 1.00
Incumbency 1.90 0.87 2.92 1.89 0.94 2.90 1.73 0.75 2.75
Spending (log10) 0.03 -0.25 0.32 0.02 -0.28 0.29 0.05 -0.27 0.39
Average Party Share 1.09 1.04 1.13 1.09 1.04 1.14 1.10 1.05 1.15
% Multi-Party Mentioners 0.52 -0.97 2.04
% MP. Mens. * #Tweets (log10) 0.83 -1.30 2.67
Replies (log10) -0.42 -1.08 0.23
Retweets (log10) 0.72 -0.03 1.50
Original tweets (log10) 0.62 -0.09 1.34
Interacting tweets (log10) -0.43 -1.33 0.45
Broadcasting tweets (log10) 1.33 0.58 2.07
Adjusted R2 0.68 0.69 0.68
N 788 818 692
Model 2.1 Model 2.2 Model 2.3
95% CI 95% CI 95% CI
NA: Internet use 
variable was the 
same in 2015 and 
2017
95% CI 95% CI 95% CI
Model 2.4 Model 2.5 Model 2.6
